Solving the Current Generality Problem

Logos and Episteme 7 (3):345-350 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many current popular views in epistemology require a belief to be the result of a reliable process (aka ‘method of belief formation’ or ‘cognitive capacity’) in order to count as knowledge. This means that the generality problem rears its head, i.e. the kind of process in question has to be spelt out, and this looks difficult to do without being either over or under-general. In response to this problem, I propose that we should adopt a more fine-grained account of the epistemic basing relation, at which point the generality problem becomes easy to solve.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-08

Downloads
821 (#19,411)

6 months
164 (#23,108)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?