バーナード・ウィリアムズの功利主義批判再考 (Bernard Williams’ Critique of Utilitarianism Reconsidered)

Japanese Student Research Notes of Philosophy of Science 4:17-25 (2021)
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Abstract

This research discusses Bernard Williams' critique of utilitarianism. I will address Williams' well-known “Integrity Objection” and clarify where his main issue with utilitarianism lies. Through this, I will demonstrate that the separation of the two viewpoints – the “inside viewpoint” and the “impartial viewpoint” - is the issue, as the utilitarian impartial viewpoint does not capture the value of ethical deliberations based on our inside viewpoint in which we presuppose our personal projects. Furthermore, I will argue that this interpretation enables us to place the objection in the context of the critique of impartiality which is one of the central themes of Williams’ ethics.

Author's Profile

Kazuki Watanabe
University of Tokyo

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