Is attention a non-propositional attitude?

In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
I argue first that attention is a (maybe the) paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode. In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude. It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move is one away from an atomistic, building block picture to a more holistic, structural picture.
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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