Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?

Mind:fzw010 (2016)
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This paper reexamines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how these points shed much-needed light on the relationship between objective and subjective truth, conceived not as different kinds or species of truth but as different ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success across different contexts of inquiry.
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Archival date: 2016-11-17
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Truth as One and Many.Lynch, Michael P.
Philosophical Grammar.Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Self-Knowing Agents.O’Brien, Lucy

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