Three New Fallacies: Appeals to Polite Conversation, Trivial Refutation, and Trivial Defense

Abstract

Fallacious reasoning can stem from interacting with purported advocates and/or critics who are not competent to fulfil their respective roles relative to the topic under discussion. The notions of the “incompetent advocate” and the “incompetent critic” are introduced and described, and they are then invoked in the descriptions of three new fallacies. I conclude with some recommendations as to how one can avoid these fallacious traps.

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2024-11-22

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