The Truth About the Future

Erkenntnis 79 (S3):365-401 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct the history of the arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presuppositions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his distinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
251 ( #22,391 of 58,385 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #31,795 of 58,385 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.