Conditionals and indexical relativism

Synthese 166 (2):333-357 (2009)
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I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism ”. The core of the view is that which proposition is expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.
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Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.

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Disagreement Without Error.Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen

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