Conditionals and indexical relativism

Synthese 166 (2):333-357 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism ”. The core of the view is that which proposition is expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.
Reprint years
2009
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WEACAI
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-05-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Almog, Joseph; Perry, John & Wettstein, Howard (eds.)
Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Disagreement Without Error.Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
295 ( #12,493 of 44,292 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #9,449 of 44,292 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.