Can we do without pragmatic encroachment?

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443 (2005)
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Abstract
I consider the problem of how to derive what an agent believes from their credence function and utility function. I argue the best solution of this problem is pragmatic, i.e. it is sensitive to the kinds of choices actually facing the agent. I further argue that this explains why our notion of justified belief appears to be pragmatic, as is argued e.g. by Fantl and McGrath. The notion of epistemic justification is not really a pragmatic notion, but it is being applied to a pragmatically defined concept, i.e. belief.
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Archival date: 2018-03-09
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References found in this work BETA
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Reduction of Mind.Lewis, David
Believing Conjunctions.Evnine, Simon J.
True, Truer, Truest.Weatherson, Brian

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Citations of this work BETA
Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Bob, Beddor & Goldstein, Simon

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