Defending interest-relative invariantism

Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609 (2011)
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Abstract
I defend interest-relative invariantism from a number of recent attacks. One common thread to my response is that interest-relative invariantism is a muchweaker thesis than is often acknowledged, and a number of the attacks only challenge very specific, and I think implausible, versions of it. Another is that a number of the attacks fail to acknowledge how many things we have independent reason to believe knowledge is sensitive to. Whether there is a defeater for someone's knowledge can be sensitive to all manner of features of their environment, as the host of examples from the post-Gettier literature shows. Adding in interest-sensitive defeaters is a much less radical move than most critics claim it is.
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WEADII
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Archival date: 2016-05-21
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