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Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 54 (2013)
Abstract
Conciliatory theories of disagreement face a revenge problem; they cannot be coherently believed by one who thinks they have peers who are not conciliationists. I argue that this is a deep problem for conciliationism.Author's Profile
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2010-11-22
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78 (#52,550)
2010-11-22
Downloads
566 (#27,493)
6 months
78 (#52,550)
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