Epistemicism, parasites, and vague names

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):276 – 279 (2003)
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John Burgess has recently argued that Timothy Williamson’s attempts to avoid the objection that his theory of vagueness is based on an untenable metaphysics of content are unsuccessful. Burgess’s arguments are important, and largely correct, but there is a mistake in the discussion of one of the key examples. In this note I provide some alternative examples and use them to repair the mistaken section of the argument.

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Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor


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