Epistemicism, parasites, and vague names

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):276 – 279 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
John Burgess has recently argued that Timothy Williamson’s attempts to avoid the objection that his theory of vagueness is based on an untenable metaphysics of content are unsuccessful. Burgess’s arguments are important, and largely correct, but there is a mistake in the discussion of one of the key examples. In this note I provide some alternative examples and use them to repair the mistaken section of the argument.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-03-09
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
139 ( #39,090 of 64,247 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #44,163 of 64,247 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.