Luminous margins

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383 (2004)
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Abstract
Timothy Williamson has recently argued that few mental states are luminous , meaning that to be in that state is to be in a position to know that you are in the state. His argument rests on the plausible principle that beliefs only count as knowledge if they are safely true. That is, any belief that could easily have been false is not a piece of knowledge. I argue that the form of the safety rule Williamson uses is inappropriate, and the correct safety rule might not conflict with luminosity.
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Archival date: 2018-03-09
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Are We Luminous?Srinivasan, Amia
Uncommon Knowledge.Lederman, Harvey

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