Many many problems

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):481–501 (2003)
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Recently four different papers have suggested that the supervaluational solution to the Problem of the Many is flawed. Stephen Schiffer (1998, 2000a, 2000b) has argued that the theory cannot account for reports of speech involving vague singular terms. Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin (2000) say that theory cannot, yet, account for vague singular beliefs. Neil McKinnon (2002) has argued that we cannot provide a plausible theory of when precisifications are acceptable, which the supervaluational theory needs. And Roy Sorensen (2000) argues that supervaluationism is inconsistent with a directly referential theory of names. McGee and McLaughlin see the problem they raise as a cause for further research, but the other authors all take the problems they raise to provide sufficient reasons to jettison supervaluationism. I will argue that none of these problems provide such a reason, though the arguments are valuable critiques. In many cases, we must make some adjustments to the supervaluational theory to meet the posed challenges. The goal of this paper is to make those adjustments, and meet the challenges.
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.Quine, W. V.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Dummett, Michael A. E.
Word and Object.Quine, Willard Van Orman

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Citations of this work BETA
Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.
Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects.Abasnezhad, Ali & Jenkins, C. S. I.

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