Running risks morally

Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163 (2014)
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I defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness. The defence is fairly simple—there is no wrong of moral recklessness. There is an intuitive argument by analogy that there should be a wrong of moral recklessness, and the bulk of the paper consists of a response to this analogy. A central part of my response is that if people were motivated to avoid moral recklessness, they would have to have an unpleasant sort of motivation, what Michael Smith calls “moral fetishism”.
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.Williamson, Timothy
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael

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One Desire Too Many.Howard, Nathan Robert

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