The Bayesian and the Dogmatist

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185 (2007)
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Abstract
Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.
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First archival date: 2016-05-21
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