What good are counterexamples?

Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31 (2003)
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Abstract
Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude that knowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason to trust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide range of cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have a greater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliable intuitions. Whats distinctive about the faulty intuitions, I argue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple, systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated, disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting the Gettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead have been explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds of cases.
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2004
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References found in this work BETA
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy.Alexander, Joshua & Weinberg, Jonathan M.

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2009-01-28

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