Anticipation and Prudential Concern

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

There is an intimate connection between personal identity, prudential concern, and anticipation. But just how close is the connection? In this paper, I develop and motivate phenomenal accounts of both anticipation and prudential concern which suggest that the link between anticipation and personal identity and the one between anticipation and prudential concern is less tight than often assumed. I start by arguing against two influential accounts of anticipation, and present an alternative view based on the notion of phenomenal continuity, which detaches anticipation from identity. Next, I consider the relationship between anticipation and prudential concern and make the case that, here too, there is more space between the two than orthodoxy alleges. A qualified form of anticipation may be sufficient for prudential concern, but anticipation is not necessary for prudential concern. Finally, I argue that prudential concern is grounded in phenomenal continuity, rather than psychological continuity. This secures a close alignment between anticipation and prudential concern and offers a plausible explanation as to why anticipation is a guide to prudential concern.

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Clas Weber
University of Western Australia

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