Reconstrução Normativa vs. Procedimentalismo: a crítica de Axel Honneth ao liberalismo procedimental

Kinesis 11 (28):114-132 (2019)
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Contemporary political philosophy is, to a certain degree, dominated by a family of theories that invoke hypothetical procedures as a method of normative justification. This article intends to analyze Axel Honneth’s critique of the so-called “proceduralism” in theories of justice, as well as to examine the author’s alternative proposal for a justification method, what he calls “normative reconstruction”. Honneth’s complaints are divided in three parts: critiques of the understanding of justice, the method of justification, and the scope of proceduralist theories of justice are raised, each one receiving an alternative formulation by the author. After reading texts by Axel Honneth, John Rawls — author of "A theory of justice", in which he presents one of the most well-known proceduralist arguments — Jürgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser, who raise problems for Honneth’s normative reconstruction, we suspect that even though Honneth’s critique of proceduralism and his proposal of normative reconstruction seem initially plausible, they are only possible if we abandon the framework of political philosophy to do what is usually called “social philosophy”.

Author Profiles

Thadeu Weber
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul
Gustavo Oliva de Oliveira
Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos


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