Which Kind of Causal Specificity Matters Biologically?

Philosophy of Science 84 (3):574-585 (2017)
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Abstract
Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on developmental processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this project. In this discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met.
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2017
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Archival date: 2016-08-30
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