Clark and Shackel on the Two‐Envelope Paradox

Mind 112 (448):685-689 (2003)
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Abstract

Clark and Shackel have recently argued that previous attempts to resolve the two-envelope paradox fail, and that we must look to symmetries of the relevant expected-value calculations for a solution. Clark and Shackel also argue for a novel solution to the peeking case, a variant of the two-envelope scenario in which you are allowed to look in your envelope before deciding whether or not to swap. Whatever the merits of these solutions, they go beyond accepted decision theory, even contradicting it in the peeking case. Thus if we are to take their solutions seriously, we must understand Clark and Shackel to be proposing a revision of standard decision theory. Understood as such, we will argue, their proposal is both implausible and unnecessary.

Author Profiles

Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Jonathan Weisberg
University of Toronto, Mississauga

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