Du Châtelet’s Libertarianism

History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):219-241 (2022)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet’s challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay. I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet’s essay, and especially the dialectic between various strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WELDCL
Upload history
First archival date: 2022-03-27
Latest version: 3 (2022-07-28)
View other versions
Added to PP
2022-03-27

Downloads
80 (#58,180)

6 months
56 (#13,625)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?