Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):261-272 (2015)
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Abstract
Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering a few objections that help to further illustrate the problem.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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