Pragmatic Development and the False Belief Task

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Nativists about theory of mind have typically explained why children below the age of four fail the false belief task by appealing to the demands that these tasks place on children’s developing executive abilities. However, this appeal to executive functioning cannot explain a wide range of evidence showing that social and linguistic factors also affect when children pass this task. In this paper, I present a revised nativist proposal about theory of mind development that is able to accommodate these findings, which I call the pragmatic development account. According to this proposal, we can gain a better understanding of the shift in children’s performance on standard false-belief tasks around four years of age by considering how children’s experiences with the pragmatics of belief discourse affect the way they interpret the task.
Categories
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WESPDA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-08-25
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-08-25

Total views
589 ( #10,345 of 64,133 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #19,832 of 64,133 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.