One wage of unknowability

Synthese 190 (3):339-352 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Suppose for reductio that I know a proposition of the form <p and I don’t know p>. Then by the factivity of knowledge and the distribution of knowledge over conjunction, I both know and do not know p ; which is impossible. Propositions of the form <p and I don’t know p> are therefore unknowable. Their particular kind of unknowability has been widely discussed and applied to such issues as the realism debate. It hasn’t been much applied to theories of the nature of knowledge. That is what I’m going to do here.

Author's Profile

Dennis Whitcomb
Western Washington University


Added to PP

363 (#49,111)

6 months
115 (#37,890)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?