Theroy of Mind in Non-Verbal Apes: conceptual issues and the critical experiments

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:199-223 (2001)
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Abstract

It is now over twenty years since Premack and Woodruff posed the question, ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’—‘by which we meant’, explained Premack in a later reappraisal, ‘does the ape do what humans do: attribute states of mind to the other one, and use these states to predict and explain the behaviour of the other one? For example, does the ape wonder, while looking quizzically at another individual, What does he reallywant?What does hebelieve?What are hisintentions?'

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