Abstract

What is the role of affect in moral epistemology? Sentimentalists assert that moral knowledge is rooted in knowledge of specific situational moral truths, which affect is a necessary means for attaining. Rationalists claim moral knowledge is rooted in moral principles, knowledge of which is acquired a priori through reason alone; affect is unnecessary. Note that in this way of framing the debate, the issue concerns solely moral knowledge. Recent epistemology, however, has also highlighted the importance of understanding as an epistemic good separate from knowledge. As such, moral understanding has value over and above mere moral knowledge. In this paper, I first consider a rationalist account of moral understanding that appeals to inferential capabilities due to Allison Hills. I argue by dilemma that the account cannot accommodate the distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent understanding. I then argue for a sentimentalist account of moral understanding. Not only can this account accommodate the occurrent/non-occurrent distinction, it also explains why certain moral truths seem to defy human understanding. The sentimentalist account also illuminates the role of moral understanding in forming our moral character.