Aristotelian indeterminacy and the open future

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Abstract
I explore the thesis that the future is open, in the sense that future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I survey how the thesis arises on a variety of contemporary views on the metaphysics of time. In the second, I explore the consequences for rational belief of the ‘Aristotelian’ view that indeterminacy is characterized by truth-value gaps. In the third, I outline one line of defence for the Aristotelian against the puzzles this induces: treating opinion about future contingents as a matter of fictional belief rather than simple belief.
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Archival date: 2018-11-02
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.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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2009-01-28

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