A non-pragmatic dominance argument for conditionalization

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In this paper, I provide an accuracy-based argument for conditionalization (via reflection) that does not rely on norms of maximizing expected accuracy. (This is a draft of a paper that I wrote in 2013. It stalled for no very good reason. I still believe the content is right).
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Archival date: 2018-11-02
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