A Remark on Iffy Oughts
Journal of Philosophy 109 (7):449-461 (2012)
Abstract
Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic ought must offer a solution to the miners paradox about conditional obligations. Kolodny and MacFarlane have recently argued that such a semantics must reject the validity of modus ponens. I demonstrate that rejecting the validity of modus ponens is inessential for an adequate solution to the paradox.
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0022-362X
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WILARO-4
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References found in this work BETA
Defaults in Update Semantics.Veltman, Frank
Assertion.Stalnaker, Robert
Index, Context, and Content.Lewis, David K.
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Citations of this work BETA
Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Charlow, Nate
Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals.Bledin, Justin
VI-BayesianExpressivism.Yalcin, Seth
Dynamic Thoughts on Ifs and Oughts.Willer, Malte
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2013-06-12
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2013-06-12
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307 ( #14,633 of 50,238 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #16,125 of 50,238 )
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