Coherence and probability: A probabilistic account of coherence

In M. Araszkiewicz & J. Savelka (eds.), Coherence: Insights from philosophy, jurisprudence and artificial intelligence. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 59-91 (2013)
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I develop a probabilistic account of coherence, and argue that at least in certain respects it is preferable to (at least some of) the main extant probabilistic accounts of coherence: (i) Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs’s account, (ii) Branden Fitelson’s account, (iii) Erik Olsson’s account, and (iv) Tomoji Shogenji’s account. Further, I relate the account to an important, but little discussed, problem for standard varieties of coherentism, viz., the “Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.”
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Laws and Symmetry.van Fraassen, Bas C.
Bayesian Epistemology.Bovens, Luc & Hartmann, Stephan
[Book Chapter].Thagard, P. & Shelley, C. P.

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New Hope for Relative Overlap Measures of Coherence.Koscholke, Jakob; Schippers, Michael & Stegmann, Alexander

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