Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity

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Abstract
John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification
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Archival date: 2018-11-02
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
Philosophical Papers.Lewis, David K.
On Conditionals.Edgington, Dorothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Levelling counterfactual scepticism.Sandgren, Alexander & Steele, Katie

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2009-01-28

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