Centering the Principal Principle

Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis's Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga's `Sleeping Beauty' case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.

Author's Profile

Isaac Wilhelm
National University of Singapore


Added to PP

509 (#33,375)

6 months
136 (#26,958)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?