Dynamics of Epistemic Modality

Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92 (2013)
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A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the story extends the basic framework to cover some complicated data about retraction and the interaction between epistemic modality and tense. A comparison between the suggestion made in this essay and current versions of the orthodoxy is provided.
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Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth

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Bounded Modality.Mandelkern, Matthew
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics.Khoo, Justin & Knobe, Joshua
Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Bob, Beddor & Goldstein, Simon

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