Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy
Philosophers' Imprint 14 (2014)
Abstract
Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve the indeterminacy relevant to a given choice-situation, but such capricious choices once made constrain how they will choose in the future. The account is illustrated by the case of self-interested action in situations where it is indeterminate whether you yourself will survive to benefit or suffer the consequences. The conclusion emphasizes some distinctive anti-hedging predictions of the account.
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Archival date: 2018-11-02
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Credal Dilemmas.Moss, Sarah
Cluelessness.Greaves, Hilary
Rational Illogicality.Williams, J. Robert G.
The Dispositional Account of Credence.Mahtani, Anna
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2011-10-30
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2011-10-30
Total downloads
119 ( #19,095 of 37,144 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #14,620 of 37,144 )
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