Convergence without the Public Justification Principle?: An Externalist Account of Convergence Public Reason Liberalism

Abstract

Gerald Gaus argued in his 1996 book Justificatory Liberalism that proponents of public reason liberalism should attempt to ground their position in a specific epistemology. Surprisingly, few public reason liberals have taken up Gaus on his challenge. This paper will interact with the epistemological position undergirding the public justification principle, access internalism, arguing that it fails. In its place, I put forward and defend proper functionalism as the better grounding epistemology, and then defend the new theory from possible objections. The result will be an externalist version of convergence public reason liberalism.

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2024-07-08

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