Functionalism and moral personhood: One view considered

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):521-530 (1984)
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Abstract

Daniel Dennett has offered a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being the proper object of our moral commitment, that is, for something's being a person. Strict application of these largely pragmatic conditions, however, would result in a moral community with quite a surprising membership roster, because of both who is on it and who isn't. The problem is that "your" being a person should amount to more than a function of "my" goals and cleverness.

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David Carl Wilson
Webster University

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