Individualism, causal powers, and explanation

Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39 (1992)
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Abstract

This paper examines a recent, influential argument for individualism in psychology defended by Jerry Fodor and others, what I call the argument from causal powers. I argue that this argument equivocates on the crucial notion of "causal powers", and that this equivocation constitutes a deep problem for arguments of this type. Relational and individualistic taxonomies are incompatible, and it does not seem in general to be possible to factor the former into the latter. The distinction between powers and properties plays a central role in my argument

Author's Profile

Robert A. Wilson
University of Western Australia

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