Illusions of gunk

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Worlds where things divide forever ("gunk" worlds) are apparently conceivable. The conceivability of such scenarios has been used as an argument against "nihilist" or "near-nihilist" answers to the special composition question. I argue that the mereological nihilist has the resources to explain away the illusion that gunk is possible.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WILIOG
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-11-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Parts of Classes.Lewis, David

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Metaphysical Causation.Wilson, Alastair
Nefarious Presentism.Tallant, Jonathan & Ingram, David
Composition.Korman, Daniel Z. & Carmichael, Chad

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
315 ( #7,494 of 35,946 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #6,769 of 35,946 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.