Illusions of gunk

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513 (2006)
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Worlds where things divide forever ("gunk" worlds) are apparently conceivable. The conceivability of such scenarios has been used as an argument against "nihilist" or "near-nihilist" answers to the special composition question. I argue that the mereological nihilist has the resources to explain away the illusion that gunk is possible.
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Laws and Symmetry.van Fraassen, Bas C.
Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore
Parts of Classes.Lewis, David K.

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Metaphysical Causation.Wilson, Alastair
Nefarious Presentism.Tallant, Jonathan & Ingram, David
Composition.Korman, Daniel Z. & Carmichael, Chad
Must There Be a Top Level?Bohn, Einar Duenger

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