Illusions of gunk

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Worlds where things divide forever ("gunk" worlds) are apparently conceivable. The conceivability of such scenarios has been used as an argument against "nihilist" or "near-nihilist" answers to the special composition question. I argue that the mereological nihilist has the resources to explain away the illusion that gunk is possible.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-11-02
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
555 ( #12,825 of 69,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #30,538 of 69,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.