Rational Illogicality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141 (2018)
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Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism.
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Archival date: 2018-11-02
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