Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism

Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):192-212 (2008)
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In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns such as reductio and conditional proof.
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.Williamson, Timothy
What Are Logical Notions?Corcoran, John & Tarski, Alfred
Logical Constants.MacFarlane, John

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Degree Supervaluational Logic.Williams, J. Robert G.

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