Some problems for alternative individualism

Philosophy of Science 67 (4):671-679 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper points to some problems for the position that D.M. Walsh calls "alternative individualism," and argues that in defending this view Walsh has omitted an important part of what separates individualists and externalists in psychology. Walsh's example of Hox gene complexes is discussed in detail to show why some sort of externalism about scientific taxonomy more generally is a more plausible view than any extant version of individualism

Author's Profile

Robert A. Wilson
University of Western Australia

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