The Harm of Desire Modification in Non-human Animals: Circumventing Control, Diminishing Ownership and Undermining Agency

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 35 (3):1-15 (2022)
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Abstract

It is seemingly bad for animals to have their desires modified in at least some cases, for instance where brainwashing or neurological manipulation takes place. In humans, many argue that such modification interferes with our positive liberty or undermines our autonomy but this explanation is inapplicable in the case of animals as they lack the capacity for autonomy in the relevant sense. As such, the standard view has been that, despite any intuitions to the contrary, the modification of animals’ desires is not harmful (at least not in itself). In this article, I offer a different perspective on this issue, laying the foundations of a novel argument in defence of the view that animals _can_ be harmed by desire modification directly. I suggest that the modification of an animal’s desires (under certain circumstances) is harmful for that animal because it undermines their agency.

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Marc G Wilcox
University of Leeds (PhD)

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