The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one shouldn’t inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one shouldn’t inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, holding knowledge that there’s an answer in the left hand and ignorance of the answer in the right.

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Christopher Willard-Kyle
University of Glasgow


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