The logic of phenomenal transparency

Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 2007 (16):181-195 (2007)
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This paper explores the logical consequences of the the thesis that all of the essential properties of consciousness can be known introspectively (Completeness, called "Strong Transparency" in the paper, following D.M. Armstrong's older terminology). It is argued that it can be known introspectively that consciousness does not have complete access to its essential properties; and it is show how this undermines conceivability arguments for dualism.
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The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Williford, Kenneth; Bennequin, Daniel; Friston, Karl & Rudrauf, David

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