The logic of phenomenal transparency

Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 2007 (16):181-195 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper explores the logical consequences of the the thesis that all of the essential properties of consciousness can be known introspectively (Completeness, called "Strong Transparency" in the paper, following D.M. Armstrong's older terminology). It is argued that it can be known introspectively that consciousness does not have complete access to its essential properties; and it is show how this undermines conceivability arguments for dualism.

Author's Profile

Kenneth Williford
University of Texas at Arlington

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
283 (#52,274)

6 months
48 (#74,113)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?