The possibility of onion worlds: Rebutting an argument for structural universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):193 – 203 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Some argue that theories of universals should incorporate structural universals, in order to allow for the metaphysical possibility of worlds of 'infinite descending complexity' ('onion worlds'). I argue that the possibility of such worlds does not establish the need for structural universals. So long as we admit the metaphysical possibility of emergent universals, there is an attractive alternative description of such cases.

Author's Profile

Robert Williams
University of Leeds


Added to PP

337 (#38,208)

6 months
56 (#52,472)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?