Merit and Reaction Qualifications

Political Philosophy 1 (2):488–513 (2024)
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Abstract

When selecting between applicants for a job, when and how should we take into account the reactions that they elicit from others? On one hand, applicants’ “reaction qualifications” often speak to their merit, in which case we seem required to consider them. On the other hand, others’ reactions are often rooted in prejudicial attitudes, in which case considering reaction qualifications can make the hiring process prejudicial. According to a popular view, we should refrain from considering reaction qualifications just in case there are weighty moral reasons against doing so. I argue that this morality-based approach fails. Instead, we should refrain from considering reaction qualifications just in case considering them would render a selection procedure non-transparent or discriminatory. If consideration of a reaction qualification would have either effect, the reaction qualification does not confer merit and so should not be considered by selectors.

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Karolina Wisniewska
University of Missouri, Columbia

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