Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
If a reliable testifier tells you that a song is beautiful or that an act is wrong, do you thereby have a reason to approve of the painting and disapprove of the agent's action? Many insist that we don’t: normative testimony does not give us reasons for affective attitudes like approval. This answer is often treated as a datum in the literatures on moral and aesthetic testimony. I argue that once we correct for a common methodological mistake in these literatures, the answer must be Yes. I then show why this matters for the broader discussion of the puzzle(s) posed by deference to moral and aesthetic testimony.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-09-13
View other versions
Added to PP

105 (#52,712)

6 months
33 (#25,881)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?