Moral perception, inference, and intuition
Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512 (2019)
Abstract
Sarah McGrath argues that moral perception has an advantage over its rivals in its ability to explain ordinary moral knowledge. I disagree. After clarifying what the moral perceptualist is and is not committed to, I argue that rival views are both more numerous and more plausible than McGrath suggests: specifically, I argue that inferentialism can be defended against McGrath’s objections; if her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should accept a different rival that she neglects, intuitionism; and, reductive epistemologists can appeal to non-naturalist commitments to avoid McGrath’s counterexamples.
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Archival date: 2019-11-24
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2018-03-08
Total views
264 ( #19,978 of 55,966 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
105 ( #5,707 of 55,966 )
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