Compossible Rights Must Restrict Speech

Dissertation, University of Hong Kong (2022)
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Abstract

This paper discusses why speech regulations are logically necessary for any account of a moral right to free speech. My argument for limiting the right to free speech (and more widely any right to freedom) will be grounded in compossibility. Rights to freedom, formally speaking, are claims by an agent that other people not interfere with them; a compossible set of rights is one where the domains of permissible actions—permitted by each claim (and its correlative duty) within the set—do not contradict one another across claims. I will argue that in order for claims to be coherent, they cannot generate contradictory domains, and that for a claim to non-interference to not generate contradictory domains across multiple people with the same claim, the claim must be restricted. This account as it currently stands can at least generate conclusions on the permissibility of incitement.

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