Argumentative Strategies Against Bradley’s Regress

Abstract

In this paper I will examine the infinite regress arguments pertaining to the unreality of relations that are presented in Francis Herbert Bradley’s paper, Appearance and Reality. Then I will suggest two argumentative strategies one can take to undermine Bradley’s regress argument. The first option concerns plainly rejecting the regress by stating that Bradley is viewing relations as kinds of objects that are in need of being related, whereas the second option is in regards to adopting an existential-dependence view between objects and their properties to refute the need for relations. I will conclude this paper by comparing these two strategies against each other, alluding to each of their ramifications.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-03

Downloads
404 (#46,774)

6 months
99 (#51,734)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?